

# Stable matchings from the perspective of distributed algorithms

Jukka Suomela — HIIT, University of Helsinki, Finland Joint work with Patrik Floréen, Petteri Kaski, and Valentin Polishchuk




## □ Part I: Introduction

#### Stable matchings




Input: bipartite graph  $G = (R \cup B, E) \dots$ 

- R = red nodes
- B =blue nodes




Input: bipartite graph  $\mathcal{G} = (R \cup B, E)$  and preferences


- 1 = most preferred partner
- but anyone is better than no-one




Output: a stable matching, i.e., a *matching* without *unstable edges* 




*Matching:* subset  $M \subseteq E$  of edges such that each node adjacent to at most one edge in M



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


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
*Unstable edge:* edge  $\{r,b\} \notin M$  such that

- r prefers b to r's current partner (if any)
- *b* prefers *r* to *b*'s current partner (if any)




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
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
No unstable edges  $\implies$  stable matching

- Does it always exist?
- How to find one?




# Part II:Finding a stable matching

Gale-Shapley




An adaptation of the Gale-Shapley algorithm (1962)


Begin with an empty matching



Unmatched red nodes send *proposals* to their most-preferred neighbours




Blue nodes accept the best proposal




Blue nodes accept the best proposal

Remove rejected edges and repeat...




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
Blue nodes accept the best proposal

It is ok to change mind if a better proposal is received!




Blue nodes accept the best proposal

Remove rejected edges and repeat...




#### Eventually each red node


- is matched, or
- has been rejected by all neighbours



Let  $\{r,b\} \notin M$ : (i)  $b \in B$  rejected  $r \in R$   $\implies b$  was matched to a more preferred neighbour  $\implies \{r,b\}$  is not unstable




Let  $\{r,b\} \notin M$ : (ii)  $r \in R$  did not ask  $b \in B$   $\implies r$  is matched to a more preferred neighbour  $\implies \{r,b\}$  is not unstable




The Gale-Shapley algorithm finds a stable matching

Ok, that was published 47 years ago, more recent news?




Stable matchings are unstable




Node = computer, edge = communication link

Efficient distributed algorithms for stable matchings?




The Gale—Shapley algorithm can be interpreted as a distributed algorithm

• proposal, acceptance, rejection: messages




#### Many nice properties:


- small messages, deterministic
- unique identifiers not needed




But Gale–Shapley isn't fast – it *cannot* be fast!



Solution depends on the input in distant parts of network  $\implies$  worst-case running time  $\Omega(\text{diameter})$ 



Stable matchings are unstable! Minor changes in input may require major changes in output




Stable matchings are unstable! Minor changes in input may require major changes in output

- This isn't really what we would expect to happen,
  e.g., in real-world large scale social networks
- Very distant parts of the network should not affect my choices
- Are stable matchings the right problem to study?
  Matchings that are more robust and more local?

# ☐ Part IV:Almost stable matchings

Truncating Gale-Shapley



Our contribution: asking the right questions

- What if we allow a small fraction of unstable edges?
- What happens if we run Gale—Shapley for a small number of rounds?

Others have asked similar questions, too...

What if we allow a small fraction of unstable edges?

- Biró et al. (2008): finding a maximum matching with few unstable edges is hard
- Finding any matching with few unstable edges?

Running Gale—Shapley for a small number of rounds?

- Quinn (1985): experimental work suggests that we get few unstable edges
- Any theoretical guarantees?

**Definition:** A matching M is  $\epsilon$ -stable if there are at most  $\epsilon |M|$  unstable edges


*Main result:* There is a distributed algorithm that finds an  $\epsilon$ -stable matching in  $O(\Delta^2/\epsilon)$  rounds

Algorithm: Just run the distributed version of Gale—Shapley for that many steps!

 $\Delta=$  maximum degree of  ${\cal G}$ 


During the Gale-Shapley algorithm:

 $\{r,b\} \in E$  is an unstable edge  $\implies r$  unmatched and r has not yet proposed b



Key idea: define total potential


- = number of unmatched red nodes with proposals left
- = how much red nodes could "gain" if we did not truncate Gale-Shapley



Key idea: define total potential

= number of unmatched red nodes with proposals left


#### Initially high



Key idea: define total potential

= number of unmatched red nodes with proposals left

Zero if we run the full Gale-Shapley



- Potential is non-increasing: if a red node loses its partner, another red node gains a partner
- Assume that potential is  $\alpha$  after round k > 1
  - $\implies \alpha$  nodes received 'no' or 'break' in round k
  - $\implies$  at least  $\alpha$  edges removed in round k
  - $\implies$  at least  $(k-1)\alpha$  edges removed in rounds  $2,3,\ldots,k$
- At most  $O(\Delta |M|)$  edges removed in total
  - $\implies$  potential  $O(\Delta |M|/k)$  after round k
  - $\implies O(\Delta^2 |M|/k)$  unstable edges

Generalises to weighted matchings

Applications (in bipartite, bounded-degree graphs):


- Local  $(2 + \epsilon)$ -approximation algorithm for maximum-weight matching
- Centralised randomised algorithm for estimating the size of a stable matching

(All stable matchings have the same size!)

But I think the most interesting observation is this:

- Almost stable matchings are a *local* problem (at least in bounded-degree graphs)
- There is a simple local algorithm that finds a *robust*, almost stable matching M
- The matching M can be easily maintained in a dynamic network, constructed by using an efficient self-stabilising algorithm, etc.

Research question: are *almost stable matchings* the right concept when we try to understand and analyse real-world social networks, matching markets, etc.?



## Summary

#### Stable matching:

global problem, any solution is unrobust

Almost stable matching:

• local problem, robust solutions exist

No new algorithms needed, just a new analysis of the Gale–Shapley algorithm from 1962

http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/jukka.suomela/